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Abstract 
Growth theories suggest that the factors affecting growth at low-income and high-income 
countries can be different. If countries struggle to graduate to high-income growth 
strategies, they may find themselves "stuck" at some middle-income level. This 
phenomenon can be termed as "middle-income trap". Using a panel of 1 45 countries over 
a period of 55 years, this study attempts to identify the existence of "middle-income trap" 
and its determinants. The aim of this study is to inspect whether the countries really get 
"stuck" at middle-income levels and if so, then pinpoint the factors associated with 
growth slowdowns. By employing panel probit estimations, this study has found evidence 
of the existence of middle-income trap. Most of the middle-income countries are sticky to 
their income levels and failed to make the additional leap necessary to achieve a high­
income status. The study has identified the crucial factors associated with growth 
slowdowns and compared whether these factors in middle-income countries are any 
different than the low and high income countries . The results were validated using 
Bayesian Models and the findings suggest that the determinants of growth at middle and 
high income levels differ and middle income countries do need to change growth 
strategies to move smoothly to the high-income status. The recent anxiety over the issue 
of"middle-income trap" is not unfounded and this study affirms that the existing policies 
that have enabled few low-income counties to grow to middle income countries are not 
sufficient for transitioning to a high-income level. Middle-income countries need growth 
policies that are aimed at strong and sustained growth to help them to graduate to high­
income status eventually. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The rapid growth of emerging economies is one of the celebrated storylines of our time 
and definitely the most influential economic development that has affected the lives of 
world' s  population during the first decade of 2l8t century. Rapid economic growth has 
elevated many low and middle income countries to middle and high income countries 
respectively. It has pulled millions of households out of poverty. In a tumultuous period, 
when advanced economies have been economically challenged and fmancially troubled, 
rapid growth of emerging economies has provided for the majority share of global 
growth. However, the question is how long the emerging economies can sustain this rapid 
growth. 
The empirical growth literature has tacitly assumed economic growth to be a 
steady process, consistent with a broad array of theoretical models. Researchers have 
long been interested in the dynamics of growth and the gradual convergence of all 
economies in terms of per capita income. For instance, Mankiw, Romer and Weil ( 1 992), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1 992) and Evans ( 1996) used cross-country data from the 
second half of the 20th century to examine the determinants of average GDP per capita 
growth over a decade or more. Their results showed that most countries seem to be 
converging at about the rate the augmented Solow ( 1 956) model predicted. 
On the other hand, Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort ( 1 996) used panel data and 
generalized method of moments to prove that per capita incomes converge to their 
steady-state levels at a rate of approximately 1 0  percent per year as opposed to the 
general consensus of 2 percent. Also Islam ( 1995) used dynamic panels with country 
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effects to show that the estimated rates of conditional convergence prove to be higher. In 
either case, though, the estimation is focused on identifying a gradual convergence path, 
with a single convergence coefficient. 
However, the growth dynamics in the real world are much more intricate than 
identifying fluctuations around a stable trend. The recent growth literature has 
underestimated the importance and failed to consider the implications of instability and 
volatility of growth rates as pointed out by Pritchett ( 1 998). He called for more inspection 
of ''the hills, plateaus, mountains and plains" evident in the growth documentation. 
Analyses of growth records have given rise to a literature that attempts to track 
growth slowdowns and the middle-income trap. Growth slowdowns refers to prolonged 
periods of stagnation or recession and represents a substantial deviation from the previous 
growth for a country. The "middle-income trap" is a theorized situation, where a rapidly 
growing country will stagnate at middle-income levels and will fail to attain the status of 
high-income countries. From a policy maker's  perspectives, factors related to growth 
slowdowns and middle-income trap is of particular importance as concerns about being 
stuck at a particular income level have been acute in emerging economies. 
In middle-income economies, the consternation of a "middle-income trap" is 
growing. Since the 1950s rapid economic growth has allowed a significant number of 
countries to achieve the middle-income status but very few of these countries have been 
able to make the additional leap needed to reach the high-income status. Several Latin 
American countries would seem to be trapped in the middle-income group and these 
countries failed to graduate to high-income levels where as some East Asian countries 
have continued to grow rapidly after attaining middle-income status for some time. These 
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East Asian countries were cited as model for success as they managed to reach per capita 
income levels comparable to those of advanced countries but recent slower growth in 
China, India and Vietnam points to a reduction in trend growth and exhibits risk of being 
trapped in middle-income levels.  Although Asia's expected growth remains higher than 
that of other regions, the slowdown has revived the debate middle-income trap. 
This paper aims to augment the understanding of growth slowdowns and the 
middle-income trap. It contributes to the existing literatures in a number of ways. First, it 
identifies the period of slowdowns by applying the augmented Solow model, which is a 
standard growth model, instead of simply identifying structural breaks in the time trend 
of economic growths. Second, after identifying the growth slowdowns, it proves that 
these incidences of slowdowns are disproportionately likely to occur in middle-income 
countries. Third, by identifying the middle-income trap, this paper empirically justifies 
the policy concerns about the middle-income trap. Fourth, it identifies the determinants of 
growth slowdowns in a systematic way by using panel probit estimations and validating 
the results using two variations of Bayesian model selection. Finally, it provides an idea 
about the world income distribution by using the mobility matrix. This paper is the most 
comprehensive and recent study involving growth slowdowns and middle-income trap. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief 
review of the existing literature on growth slowdowns. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical 
and empirical models. Chapter 4 presents the results and discusses the key findings, and 
Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The term "middle-income trap" was apparently coined by Gill, Kharas, et al. (2007) 
describing a situation, in which, countries suffer from deceleration in growth, after 
experiencing a period of rapid growth in per capita income. 
Much of the literature on middle-income trap focuses on the experience of Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa, and especially East Asia. Recent slowdown 
in economic growth in China has revitalized the debate over the causes of economic 
slowdown. The evidence on middle-income trap has been analyzed in terms of both 
descriptive terms and structured econometric models. 
World Bank (20 12) has conducted descriptive studies on middle-income traps 
using broad cross-country comparisons, while Hill et al. (20 12), Flaaen et al. (2014), 
Agenor and El Aynaoui (20 1 5), and Cherif and Hasanov (20 1 5) have used more country­
specific data. According to the World Bank (20 12), there were 1 0 1  middle-income 
countries in 1 960. Out of those 1 0 1  countries, merely 1 3  had become high income by 
2008. These 13 countries are Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, 
Japan, Mauritius, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan. 
Among these countries, the four Asian tigers-Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan have experienced a transition in their output composition. Hong Kong and 
Singapore have moved to electronics assembly and then on to component manufacturing, 
from low-margin, labor-intensive goods such as clothing and toys, whereas South Korea 
and Taiwan have moved to advanced manufacturing, design and management. Unlike 
Asian countries, most countries in Latin America, as well as in the Middle East and North 
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Africa, reached middle-income status during the 1 960s and 1 970s, and have stayed there 
ever since. Also in Asia, Malaysia and Thailand are examples of the growth slowdown 
that typically characterizes a middle-income trap. Ohno (2009) and Garrett (2004) have 
also taken a descriptive approach to defme middle-income trap and emphasized on the 
necessity for middle income countries to move up the value chain. They argued that the 
middle-income trap is the result of reliance on short-sighted and restricted growth 
startegies. 
Eichengreen et al. (20 1 3) have taken an econometric approach to ask whether 
middle-income countries are more likely than others to experience a growth slowdown. 
They defined middle-income trap as a decline of at least 2 percentage points relative to a 
7-year moving average. They concluded that there appear to be two ranges of growth 
slowdowns: one between $1 0,000 and $1 1 ,000 and the other between $1 5,000 and 
$1 6,000. The implication is that countries may fmd themselves slowing down at lower 
income levels than previously believed and decelerate in steps, rather than smoothly or at 
a single point in time. They also emphasize the importance of moving up the technology 
ladder in order to avoid such a secular slowdown. 
In a subsequent study, Eichengreen et al. (20 14) searched for structural breaks by 
applying a Chow test to a sample of formerly fast growing middle-income countries. 
Their results showed that the likelihood of sudden slowdowns is bimodal, having its 
peaks in the range of $1 0,000-$1 1 ,000 in 2005 PPP US dollars at and in the higher 
interval of $1 5,000-$1 6,000 constant prices. This evidence seems to suggest therefore 
that a large group of middle-income countries is at risk of being caught up a trap. 
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Aiyar et al. (20 1 3) took a similar approach, differing from Eichengreen in the 
counterfactual against which a growth slowdown is measured. Aiyar et al . used the 
predictions of a Solow growth model. They identified and examined 123 episodes of 
growth slowdowns since 1 960 and found that indeed middle-income countries (defined as 
those with income levels between $2,000 and $1 5,000) have a greater frequency of 
slowdowns than either advanced or low-income countries. They also showed that some of 
the explanatory variables for growth slowdowns differ between middle-income countries 
and the remaining countries in the sample. Middle-income countries with low levels of 
infrastructure and limited regional integration are more likely to have slowdowns. 
Felipe et al. (20 12) applied an altogether different approach. They defined four 
income groups on the basis of absolute levels of GDP per capita during the period 1 950-
20 10 :  low income economies are those with a GDP per capita below $2,000; lower 
middle-income economies are those with a GDP per capital between $2,000 and $7,250; 
upper middle-income economies are those with a GDP per capita between $7 ,250 and 
$1 1 ,750 and high income countries are those with a GDP per capita above $1 1 ,750. They 
alleged that if a country is stuck in the lower middle-income category for more than 28 
years, or in the upper-middle income for more than 14 years, then the country is caught in 
a middle-income trap. The thresholds-28 years and 14 years were the median number of 
years that the sample countries spent in their respective income categories. Thus, to avoid 
the middle-income trap, a country needs to grow fast enough to be able to cross the lower 
middle-income group in at most 28 years, and the upper middle-income group in at most 
14  years. Using this methodology, they found that, out of the 124 sampled countries, 
there were 52 middle-income countries in 20 1 0; and out of that 52 countries, 35 countries 
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were caught in a middle-income trap, that is almost two-third of the countries were stuck 
at the middle-income level. The 35 countries consisted of 1 3  countries in Latin America, 
1 1  countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and 3 countries in Asia. Moreover, 
using disaggregate trade data, they found that countries caught in that trap were all 
characterized by lower sophistication and diversification of their exports. 
Im and Rosenblatt (20 13 )  created a set of thresholds based on a country's GDP 
per capita relative to that of the United States, and inspected the probability of a country 
transitioning to a higher category. They found that the probability of countries with 
middle-incomes transitioning to a higher category is quite low; in other words, they found 
evidence of a middle-income trap when the country's income was compared with that of 
U.S. 
Agenor and Canuto (20 1 2) reached similar conclusions by graphing GDP per 
capita relative to the United States in 1 960 against the 2008 GDP per capita relative to the 
United States to show that most middle-income countries were indeed stuck and there 
was no evidence of convergence with the U.S. over the period of 48 years. 
Hawksworth (20 14) also focused on convergence to design an ESCAPE index by 
combining 20 different indicators that are taken from cross-country regressions of growth 
and convergence, including economic, social, political, regulatory infrastructure and 
environmental sustainability variables. Based on this, he identified a fragile group of five 
countries that could get stuck because they do not display the policy and structural 
characteristics to sustain rapid growth. Hawksworth does not, however, attempt any 
statistical validation of his methodology. 
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But some researchers remained critical about the notion of middle income trap. Bulman 
et al. (2014) did not find any evidence for unusual stagnation at any middle-income 
levels. However, they did find evidence that the determinants of growth at low and high 
income levels differ. They suggested that middle-income countries may need to change 
growth strategies to transition smoothly to high-income growth strategies. 
The Economist newspaper challenged the idea of the middle-income trap by 
diagramming the decadal growth rates against initial income for 1 60 countries, excluding 
oil exporters, between 1 950 and 20 10. The fmdings showed that per capita income 
growth in middle income countries was actually higher than in other countries. Following 
the Eichengreen et al. methodology, it further inspected the episodes of growth 
slowdowns and observed that the probability of a growth slowdown did not appear to 
increase at middle-income levels. Hence, it referred to the whole debate as futile. 
A review of the literature reveals that researchers have applied different 
defmitions and methodologies to identify middle-income trap and its determinants. There 
is an obvious lack of consensus among the researchers about the existence of middle­
income trap. Also the amount of literature on growth slowdowns in middle-income 
countries is insufficient. This study bridges the gap between the theory and empirical 
analysis by applying a methodology that is more entrenched in theory. It also analyzes 
the determinants of growth slowdowns in a structured way by including a variety of 
potential explanatory variables. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The standard Solow ( 1 956) neoclassical growth model talces the rates of savings, 
population growth, depreciation and technological change across countries as exogenous 
and predicts that poor countries will grow faster than rich countries and gradually 
converge to their steady states. 
However, conditional convergence framework states that there are some other 
variables, in addition to these parameters, that can influence the steady state. Because of 
differences in these other variables across countries, different economies can converge to 
different steady states. This study identifies growth slowdowns by operationalizing on 
these strong predictions from the theory and describes growth slowdowns in terms of 
sudden and sustained deviations from the predicted growth path. 
The output can be modelled as a function of inputs and technology using the 
following aggregate production function: 
Y = AKaLP ... ... ... (1) 
Here, Y represents output that is GDP per capita, K is physical capital, L is labor 
or human capital and A is the total factor productivity (TFP). Equation ( 1 )  is the Cobb­
Douglas production function where a and p are the output elasticities of physical and 
human capital respectively and p = 1 - a. The values of a and pare constants that are 
determined by the available technology. 
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An equation for the log of output in country i at time t can be derived by talcing logs of 
the aggregate production function: 
Yit = ait + akit + P lit ... ... ... (2) 
Here, Yit , kit and lit are the logs of output, physical capital and human capital 
respectively. However, ait• the level of total factor productivity (TFP) in country i at time 
t, is not observed and when the equation is estimated, ait appears as an error term. So, 
equation (2) can be rewritten as follows: 
Yit = a;t + akit + P lit + Vit ... ... ... (3) 
Here, a;t is country i 's  long-run, steady-state level of total factor productivity 
(TFP) at time t and Vit is represents country i's deviation from the world's  common level 
of technology at time t. Mankiw, Romer and Weil ( 1 992) propounded that aitis the same 
for every country, so ait=ac. 
For estimation, it is useful to turn equation (3) into a growth equation. By 
differencing equation (3): 
Ayit =Aat+aAkit+ {J Alit + Vit"'"'"'(4) 
Estimating equation (4) will yield a predicted rate of growth for each country i at 
time t. The residuals will show whether a country is growing faster or slower than the 
expected growth. The growth slowdowns here can be characterized as total factor 
productivity (TFP) slowdowns due to the keen focus on total factor productivity (TFP). 
The brief discussion on different aspects of the Solow model has established the 
theoretical framework for the issues related to growth slowdowns. The Solow model 
argues for a balanced growth path and the low-income countries should catch up with the 
high-income countries and converge towards the level of high-income countries. 
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3.2 Empirical Model 
3.2.1 Identifying Growth Slowdowns 
This study uses annual data on per capita income in constant 20 1 1  international dollars to 
compute five-year rolling geometric averages of GDP per capita growth rates. The 
sample covers 145 countries over 1 1  five-year periods ( 1 960-20 14). The specification 
used in the study is: 
GrOWth,t = ai,t + {31 GNii,t-1+ {32 /1 Kit+ {33 11 Hit+ Vit·············· .. ····· ( 1 )  
Where for country i in  time period t, Growthit i s  the five-year panel of  per capita 
GDP growth, GNh_t-1is lagged income level, /1 Kit is change in the rate of physical 
capital and /1 Hit is the change in the rate of human capital. So, the five-year panel of per 
capita GDP growth is regressed on the lagged income level and change in the standard 
measures of physical and human capital using random effects generalized least square 
estimation. 
The random effects generalized least square estimation is used because there are 
differences across countries that have some influence on the per capita GDP growth. 
Also, Hausman test results support that the model should be random effects model. The 
rate of investment in physical capital is taken from the Penn World Table 8.1. Stock of 
human capital has been used as a proxy for human capital . This panel regression 
predicted an estimated growth rate, conditional on its level of income and factor 
endowments. 
The panel regression also provided residuals which is defined as actual growth 
rate minus estimated growth rate. A positive residual means that the country is growing 
faster than expected growth whereas a negative residual means that the country is lagging 
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behind and growing slower than the expected growth. Thus, growth slowdown periods 
for a country i can be identified if-
resf - resl_1<p(0.20) ... . . . .... . .  (a) 
resl+i - resl_1<p(0.20) .. . ... . ... (b) 
Here p (.20) = the 20th percentile of the distribution of differences in residuals 
from one-time period to another. Conditions (a) and (b) make intuitive sense because 
condition (a) states that between period t-1 and t, the residual of a particular country 
becomes much smaller. That means, the country's performance relative to the expected 
growth pattern has declined substantially and this decline has placed the country-period 
observation in the bottom quintile of changes in the residual between consecutive time 
periods. 
Condition (b) is used to ignore slowdown episodes where growth slows down in 
the current period only to go back up in the next period. This condition inspects the 
differences in residuals between period t-1 and period t+ 1, which is over a ten-year 
period. These conditions suggest that slowdowns cannot be identified for the sample's 
initial period (1960-1964) and final period (2010-2014) as there are no prior and 
subsequent periods for comparison. Conditions (a) and (b) together precisely identify the 
relative nature of growth slowdowns. 
Table A.3.1 (in Appendix A) provides the list of all country-periods identified as 
slowdowns by the conditions. A second variant of the specification has been constructed 
using the absolute convergence framework, in which the initial random effects panel 
regression excludes physical capital and human capital as regressors, retaining only the 
initial level of income. Table A.3.2 (in Appendix A) provides the list of country-periods 
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slowdowns identified by using the conditional convergence and absolute convergence 
framework. 
It is worth noting that the slowdown episodes identified by using the conditional 
and absolute convergence frameworks are rather similar. This demonstrates that for 
sustained shifts away from the convergence path, growth slowdowns are almost 
synonymous with Total Factor Productivity {TFP) Slowdowns. But both the conditional 
and absolute convergence frameworks contradict from the EPS. This could be due to the 
fact that EPS study mainly focused on developed and oil exporting countries. But this 
study focuses on slowdowns at all income levels relative to the predicted growth and 
identifies the presence of slowdown episodes in middle-income countries. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of slowdown variable, which has been created 
using the conditions (a) and (b), by region. Out of the 1305 observations collected in the 
dataset, the algorithm in conditions (a)-(b) selects 195 slowdowns, that is, almost 
15 percent of the overall sample. Table 1 and 2 highlights important facts about the 
frequency of slowdown episodes by region and time period. 
Slowdown 
Variable 
0 
1 
Total 
Slowdown 
Frequency 
(%) 
Table 1. Distribution of Slowdown Episodes by Region 
Advanced East Europe 
Asia and 
and Central 
Pacific Asia 
2 1 1 1 12 1 7 1  
23 23 36 
234 1 35 207 
9.83 1 7.04 1 7.39 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
13 
1 6 1  
3 7  
198 
1 8.69 
Middle South 
East Asia 
and 
North 
Africa 
1 2 1  55 
23 8 
1 44 63 
1 5 .97 1 2.70 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
279 
45 
324 
1 3 .89 
Total 
1 , 110 
195  
1 ,305 
14.94 
Table 1 highlights two important facts. First, the regional frequency of past slowdown 
episodes- measured as the ratio of slowdown episodes to overall number of 
observations in the region-was significantly higher in developing regions, in particular 
Latin America, Middle East, North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia. But 
the slowdown frequency is lower for the advanced economies. 
3.2.2 Identifying Middle-Income Trap 
After generating the slowdown variable, this study inspects the existence of middle­
income trap--whether countries that have achieved middle-income status are more likely 
to experience growth slowdowns than low-income and high-income countries. There is 
no generally accepted definition of middle-income status, so this study tries to identify 
middle-income countries using a range of possible lower and upper thresholds for 
middle-income status. Following Abdon, Felipe and Kumar (2012) and Aiyer, Duval, et 
al. (2013), the income status is defined using sets of GDP per capita (in 2011 PPP$) 
thresholds. Each set i consists of two thresholds thl.i and th2,i> where thl.i <th2,i. Here, 
th1,t and th2,t are the thresholds that separate low-income countries from middle-income 
countries and middle-income countries from high-income countries respectively. 
The study assumed that th1,i can take three values-2000, 3000 and 4000 (2011 
PPP$) while values for th2,i range from 12,000 up to 16,000 (in increments of 1,000). 
Using this assumption, the values generates 15 classifications (3 x 5) to identify middle 
income countries in the dataset. For instance, 2/12 refers to a low income threshold of 
$2000 and a high income threshold of $12000 (in 2011 PPP$). Figure 1 summarizes the 
results by plotting, within each income class, the ratio of slowdowns to total observations. 
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Figure 1 .  Identifying Middle-Income Traps 
Figure 1 makes it clear that the middle-income countries are more likely to 
experience growth slowdowns, and the growth slowdown occurs disproportionately in the 
middle-income countries. This result is robust to the extensive range of income 
thresholds used for defining the middle-income class. 
The graph makes it clear that in the sample, the relative frequency of slowdown episodes 
for the middle-income category is always significantly higher than for the low-income 
and high-income categories. For the remainder of the paper, income category will refer to 
the 2/15 definition- a low income threshold of $2000 and a high income threshold of 
$15000 (in 2011 PPP $) as the classification generated by this threshold points is 
immensely close to the GNI per capita (Atlas method) classification developed by the 
World Bank. 
3.2.3 Identifying the Determinants of Growth Slowdowns 
After identifying growth slowdowns, this study focuses on studying their determinants. 
To study the determinants of growth slowdowns, it estimates the impact of various 
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determinants on the probability of a country undergoing a slowdown in a particular 
period by using the panel probit model. The challenge is that growth slowdowns can be 
affected by a number of potential determinants. Just like growth itself, growth slowdowns 
could occur due to a host of factors. 
Growth can be accelerated due to favorable demographics, thereby reducing the 
probability of a slowdown. Institutions can also play important role-lack of good 
institutions or deficiency in existing institutions could hinder growth by deterring 
innovation, hampering the efficient allocation of resources and reducing the returns to 
entrepreneurship. Structural characteristics of the economy, infrastructure, financial 
situation, productive capacity, industrialization, labor market characteristics, natural 
resources, and technology development could impact independent effects on growth. 
Also macroeconomic factors such as terms of trade or asset price cycles, could alter the 
probability of a sustained growth slowdown. Since there is no consensus about why and 
how middle-income economies may be different, it is imperative to include all the 
possible potential determinants. 
This study follows the recent growth literature to identify the causes of 
slowdowns. In doing so, this study has considered as broad a range of factors as possible, 
guided by the growth literature. The set of regressors comprises 45 explanatory variables 
grouped into eight categories: (i) Institutions and Economic Freedom; (ii) Demography; 
(iii) Infrastructure; (iv) Health; (v) Macroeconomic Environment and Policies; (vi) 
Economic Structure; (vii) Trade structure; and (viii) Other. 
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3.3 Estimation Techniques 
This study employs panel probit specifications to study the determinants of growth 
slowdowns. The panel data model is a superior analysis than the country specific 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or Linear Probability Model (LPM). Unlike the pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model, Panel Probit analysis can account for country 
specific effects. So, in this study, Panel Probit models were estimated using slowdown as 
the independent variable with a broad array of explanatory variables, grouped under the 
eight categories. 
The backward and forward selection procedures were employed to generate a 
limited set of regressors. The backward selection procedures refer to starting with the 
maximum number of potential explanatory variables, and then dropping the least 
significant variable. This process is repeated until all remaining variables are significant. 
The forward selection procedure involves entering the variables one-by-one in a 
piecewise fashion and retaining only the significant variables. 
Including a large number of potential regressors has an important drawback, that is, 
model uncertainty. Model uncertainty is a well-known issue in growth empirics where 
not knowing the ''true" model tends to inflate the numbers of regressors or cast doubt on 
the selected random regressors. When the sample size is limited, growth regressions with 
a wide number of regressors tend to produce unstable and sometimes contradictory 
results due to model uncertainty. Although the sample size of this study is larger, the 
issue of model uncertainty is relevant. To address model uncertainty, Bayesian Model 
Averaging Techniques have been applied. 
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After every panel probit estimation, two Bayesian model-averaging techniques were 
applied to the corresponding panel probability model to assess the robustness of the 
results: The Weighted Average Least Squares (W ALS) methodology developed by 
Magnus, Powell, and Priifer (2010) and the more standard Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA) developed by Leamer (1978) and popularized by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhoffer and 
Miller (2004). Appendix C provides a brief technical description of Weighted Average 
Least Squares (WALS) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) methods. 
The second problem of using a large number of regressors is data unavailability. 
The sample of 145 countries over 55 years implies inevitable data gaps. Even though the 
data consists of 1305 observations with 195 slowdowns, data gaps in potential regressors 
can drastically reduce the sample size for estimation. To address this issue, the study has 
grouped potential explanatory variables into eight categories and estimated their impact 
on slowdown episodes separately. Because of having relatively large sample size within 
each grouped category, this study has avoided the data unavailability problem. Appendix 
A.3.4 (in Appendix A) reports the sample statistics for the preferred regression by region 
and time period to give an idea about the differences in coverage between different 
categories of variables. 
The empirical procedure to identify the determinants of growth slowdowns 
proceeds through the following two steps: 
Step 1: For each category, panel probit specifications were estimated with lagged 
level and differenced values of all possible explanatory variables within the specific 
economic category. That is, under each of the eight categories, for a slowdown episode 
over 1965--69, the average level of each variable is used together with the change in that 
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variable between 1960 and 1965. This approach minimizes possible endogeneity issues. 
The backward and foiward selection procedures have been employed to identify a 
restricted set of robust regressors. 
Step 2: To assess the robustness of the preferred panel probit specification 
identified in step 1, this study employed Bayesian averaging techniques (BMA and 
WALS) over the full set of variables within the category of interest. 
3.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
The study has exploited a wide variety of explanatory variables and growth literature to 
identify the 45 regressors. The data for this study covers five-year panel of 145 countries 
over the years 1960 to 2014. Starting with 7975 observations (145 countries times 55 
observations for each), this study employs five-year rolling averages to compute a five­
year panel for the sampled countries. This smooths out the business cycle fluctuations so 
that short term noises can be ignored and results in the sample size of 1595 observations, 
consisting of 11 observations for each of the 145 countries. Most of the data were 
collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the world bank. 
However, the actual number of explanatory variables used is larger than 45 
because this study has also tests whether the forms in which these variables influence 
slowdown probabilities are, more appropriately, levels or differences. So, both the initial 
level (at the beginning of the period) and lagged difference of variables appear as 
regressors using the foiward and backward selection procedures. Table A.3.3 (in 
Appendix A) provides a table of variable units and sources. Table A.3.4 (in Appendix A) 
reports the descriptive statistics. 
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Chapter4 
Results and Discussion 
4.1 Results of Growth Slowdown Regressions 
The proximate explanatory variables that can explain growth or slowdowns are culled 
from the growth literature, which is too vast to review. The rationale of each chosen 
regressor is briefly discussed before the presentation of results under each category. 
4.1.1 Institutions and Economic Freedom 
Institutions are crucial for growth and growth literature has paid attention on the role of 
different types of institutions in accelerating economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de 
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) contended that the quality of a country's legal 
institutions-such as legal protection of outside investors-could affect the extent of rent 
seeking by corporate insiders and thereby promote financial development. 
Buchanan and Tullock, (1963); North, (1981, 1990); and DeLong and Shleifer, 
(1993) called for limited government to accelerate growth. Knack and Keefer (1997) 
showed that formal institutions that promote property rights and contract enforcement are 
necessary to build social capital, which in turn is related to better economic performance. 
Grilli and Millesi-Feretti ( 1995), Quinn ( 1997) and Edwards (2001) have focused 
on the relationship between financial openness and growth. On the other hand, Bussiere 
and Fratscher (2008) have accepted that financial liberalization may cause an initial 
acceleration of growth. But per their results, this growth may be difficult to sustain. They 
also opinioned that this growth can be subject to temporary reversals over a longer time 
horizon. 
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This study has used five institutional and economic freedom variables. Four are taken 
from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. The Rule of Law index 
integrates indicators of judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property 
rights, military interference in the rule of law and politics, integrity of the legal system, 
legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, 
business cost of crime and reliability of police. The Size of Government index is a 
measure of governmental involvement in the economy. This index is estimated using a 
wide number of measures such as government consumption, subsidies and transfers as a 
percentage of GDP, government investment, and top marginal tax rates. 
The Regulation index is a measure of the efficiency of the government in a 
regulatory process and combine indices measuring business, labor and credit market 
regulations. Freedom to Trade Internationally index is constructed from measures of 
tariffs, regulatory trade barriers, black market exchange rates and international capital 
market controls. The four indices are constructed such that a higher value of the index 
indicates better rule of law, limited government, less regulation and more freedom to 
trade. 
The fifth variable used is the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness developed by 
Chinn and Ito (2006). This is based on binary dummy variables codifying the tabulation 
of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Table 2 reports the result of the "best" probit specification. The first panel 
presents coefficient estimates and p-values for those variables found to be significant in 
the probit analysis. Using the fotward and backward selection procedures, significance of 
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three variables can be asserted. The level of Rule of Law is significant-sound legal 
systems, legal enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights are strongly 
associated with a reduced probability of a growth slowdown episode. The Size of 
Government and Regulation indices are also highly significant both in levels and 
differences. This suggests that limited governmental intervention and deregulation of 
credit, labor and product markets reduce the probability of growth slowdowns both in 
current and subsequent periods. 
Table 2. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Institutional Variables 
I. Final probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Institutional 
Variables Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Rule of Law -0.1307 0.002 
Size of Government -0.1401 0.003 -0.1583 0.003 
Remilation -0.2462 0.001 -0.1626 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0246 
Obs. 1012 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
Institutional 
Variables WALS t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
Rule of Law -2.39 0.81 -2.05 0.85 
Freedom to Trade -0.65 0.23 -0.41 0.22 
Size of Government -2.05 0.60 -1 .63 0.90 
Regulation -2.67 0.95 -1.13 0.90 
Fianancial 
Openness 0.76 0.03 0.63 0.06 
The second panel of Table 2 shows results from Bayesian model averaging 
estimation for the complete set of explanatory variables. The BMA column reports 
posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP). Posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP) are the sum 
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of the posterior probabilities of all the regressions including that variable. Magnus, 
Powell, and Priifer (2010) suggested a PIP threshold of 0.5 to include a variable in the 
estimation. In the case of W ALS, a t-ratio with an absolute value of 1 or greater is 
typically recommended as a threshold for significance. Using these criteria, both W ALS 
and BMA find that the level of the Rule of Law, Size of Government and Regulation and 
the lagged change in Size of Government and Regulation are robust correlates of growth 
slowdowns. Both BMA and W ALS techniques precisely confirm the significance of 
variables identified using the probit analysis. 
Table B.4.1 (in Appendix B) shows the regional coverage of countries in the full 
and sub sample of data available for the regressions in a particular category. The 
comparison of the regional representation of subsample to the full sample suggests 
advanced countries are slightly over-represented in this subsample relative to the full 
sample, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia slightly underrepresented, but in general the 
correspondence is quite good. 
4.1.2 Demography 
Aiyer, Duval, et al. (2013) argued that there is little systematic impact of population 
growth in cross-country settings. In the Solow model, population growth rate is 
subtracted from the rate of growth of per capita output but new research has focused on 
the age distribution of a country's population. The countries that are experiencing a 
demographic transition due to declining mortality ratios tend to acquire a bulge in the 
working age ratio. People in the working age are more productive than those outside the 
working age group. Furthermore, workers save for their dependents and a bulge in the 
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working age ratio generates higher savings, increases available resources and creates 
productive investment opportunities. Bloom and Williamson, (1998); and 
Bloom and Canning, (2004) documented a positive impact of the working age ratio on 
economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Higgins, (1998); and Kelley and 
Schmidt, (1996) observed that national savings rates are highly associated with 
demographic structure. Aiyar and Mody (2011) focused on a particular region and used 
data on the heterogeneous evolution of the age structure of Indian states to conclude that 
much of the country's growth acceleration since the 1980s can be attributed to the 
demographic transition. Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000) and Mason (2001) 
discovered that East Asia's "economic miracle" was associated with a major transition in 
age structure. 
Gender bias is an important determinant in growth literature because this bias can 
hinder growth through higher child mortality rates, increased fertility rates, unequal 
treatment in employment opportunities and greater malnutrition of females. Sen (1992) 
argued that the occurrence of "missing women" reflects the cumulative effect of gender 
discrimination against all cohorts of women alive today. Aiyar and Mody (2011) noted 
that a more equal sex ratio is robustly connected with a higher economic growth. 
This study has taken four demographic variables to study growth slowdowns. The 
Population Growth rate is the increase in a countries population during a period of time. 
The Fertility rate is the average number of births per woman. The Dependency ratio is 
ratio of children and older population to working-age population. Finally, the Sex ratio is 
the ratio of males to females in a population. 
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The probit results in Table 3 shows that the level of Dependency ratio and the 
changes in the Dependency ratio, Sex Ratio and Fertility Rate are significantly associated 
with the probabilities of the slowdown episodes. The coefficients show the expected 
signs-a high ratio of dependents to workers increases the probability of a growth 
Slowdown. Moreover, an increase in the number of dependents to workers, the ratio of 
men to women, and number of births per women raises the probability of growth 
slowdown in subsequent periods. 
Table 3. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Demographic Variables 
I. Final probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Demographic 
Variables Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Population 
Growth 
Fertility Rate 0.4436 0.002 
Dependency 
Ratio 0.0172 0.004 0.0817 0.001 
Sex Ratio 0.0790 0.003 
Pseudo R2 0.0535 
Obs. 1230 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
Demographic 
Variables WALS t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
Population 
Growth 0.45 0.03 0.39 0.13 
Fertility Rate 0.26 0.03 1 .55 0.85 
Dependency 
Ratio 2.04 0.50 1 .29 0.52 
Sex Ratio 0.38 0.08 2.34 0.88 
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4.1.3 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is a necessary condition for economic growth as infrastructure provides 
beneficial externalities to a spectra of productive activities. It has characteristics of a 
public good and has always been considered to be positively associated with economic 
growth. 
However, when infrastructure development is measured using public investment 
as proxy, the findings were mixed as pointed out by Romp and de Hann (2007). Recent 
studies conducted by Demetriades and Mamuneas, (2000); Roller and Waverman, (2001 ); 
Calderon and Serven, (2004); Erget, Kozluk, and Sutherland, (2009) have used more 
direct measures of infrastructure and identified more strong positive impact of public 
capital on economic growth. 
This study involves three variables involving infrastructure-Electric Power 
Consumption, Internet access and Rail Lines. Electric power consumption (Kwh per 
capita) is the log of production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less 
transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power 
plants. Internet access is the number of internet users per 100 people. Rail Lines is the log 
of the country's rail route per square kilometer of land area. 
Table 4 reports the probit and robustness test results using the infrastructure 
variables. The probit results show that only the level of electric power consumption is 
significantly associated with episodes of growth slowdowns. That is, excessive electric 
power consumption increases the probability of growth slowdowns in the sampled 
countries. So, the poor infrastructure can be deemed as responsible for sustained periods 
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of growth slowdowns in the sample. Both BMA and W ALS techniques also validate the 
probit findings. 
Table 4. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Infrastructure Variables 
I. Final probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels 
Infrastructure Variables Coef. P>z 
Electric Power Consumption 0.4286 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0486 
Obs. 980 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
WALS BMA WALS BMA 
Infrastructure Variables t PIP t PIP 
Electric Power Consumption 3.1 1  0.99 -0.55 0.42 
Internet access -0.62 0.12 -0.62 0.48 
Rail Lines -0.63 0.12 0.35 0.15 
4.1.4 Health 
Economists have studied the contribution of human capital to economic growth by 
defining human capital solely in terms of schooling. Recent growth literature has 
extended production function models of economic growth to account for health also. 
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) found out that health has a positive, sizable and 
significant impact on economic growth. They suggested that a one-year improvement in a 
population's life expectancy contributes to a 4 percent increase in output. 
This study has exploited three health variables to growth slowdown episodes-
Life Expectancy at Birth, Maternal Mortality Ratio and Improved Sanitation facilities. 
Life Expectancy at Birth reflects the overall mortality level of a population. 
Life expectancy at Birth is the average number of years a new-born is expected to 
live if the mortality patterns prevalent at the time of its birth remain the same in the 
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future. Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100000 live births) is the number of registered 
maternal death due to birth- or pregnancy-related complications per 100,000 registered 
live births. Improved Sanitation Facilities is the percentage of population with access to 
improved sanitation facilities. 
Looking at Table 5, it can be said that none of the health variables are significant 
at their level values but all three of them are significant in differences. That is, a country 
with high life expectancy at birth and high maternal mortality rates has high probability 
of slowdowns in subsequent periods. This makes intuitive sense because high life 
expectancy and high maternal deaths will increase the number of aging and older 
population in a country. Improved Sanitation Facilities reduces the probability of growth 
slowdowns in subsequent periods for the sampled countries. 
Table 5. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Health Variables 
I. Final Probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Health Variables Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.02919 0.000 
Maternal Mortality Ratio 3.7577 0.007 
Improved Sanitation Facilities -0.9947 0.002 
Pseudo R2 0.1390 
Obs. 1 230 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
WALS BMA WALS BMA 
Health Variables t PIP t PIP 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.35 0.08 2.25 0.87 
Maternal Mortality Ratio 0.09 0.07 1.91 0.81 
Improved Sanitation Facilities -0.13 0.07 -1.50 0.54 
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4.1.S Macroeconomic Environment and Policies 
Growth literature have identified a wide variety of macroeconomic factors associated 
with a country's economic growth and shocks to the economic growth. Capital inflows 
have always been identified as conducive to economic growth as it allows capital to be 
allocated to areas where its marginal product is highest. 
Capital inflows facilitate consumption smoothing and diversify idiosyncratic 
income risks. But Calvo (1998) identified that periods of surging capital inflows are 
sometimes followed by a cessation or even reversal of the capital flow. This cessation or 
reversal of capital flows results in severe repercussions for an economy. 
Cetorelli and Goldberg, (2011) and Aiyar, (2011, 2012) used recent evidence 
from the global financial crisis to propose that high domestic spillovers result in reliance 
on cross-border banking flows. Cerra and Saxena (2008) showed that banking crises and 
sudden stops may not affect the long-term growth but these shocks will lower potential 
output levels permanently. The decrease in potential out levels will cause persistent 
though temporary impact on potential economic growth. 
Domestic investment is another crucial factor for growth but overinvestment may 
create growth slowdowns. Hori (2007) pointed out that the investment slump after the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s was at least partly due to overinvestment. Investment 
booms may cause excessive borrowing and rapid accumulation of public and/or external 
debt. 
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Another factor associated with economic growth is inflation. Fischer (1993) showed that 
inflation is associated with negative economic growth. However subsequent literature 
studying the impact of inflation on economic growth have found ambiguous results, 
especially when inflation is at low or moderate levels. 
Relationship between growth and price competitiveness has been extensively 
studied by the development economists. Easterly et al., (1993) and Mendoza (1997) 
proved that terms of trade shocks can explain part of the variance in growth across 
countries. 
For countries that are large importers or exporters of fuel and food, such shocks 
could be particularly pertinent. However, there is no evidence that providing additional 
financing in excess of domestic savings is the channel through which financial integration 
delivers its benefits, as mentioned by Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007). 
To study the impact of macroeconomic environment on growth slowdowns, this 
study used a number of potential explanatory variables-Gross Capital Inflows/GDP, 
Gross Capital Outflows/GDP, Investment share or Gross Capital Formation (percentage 
of GDP), Trade Openness, Public Debt/GDP, External Debt/GDP, Inflation, Real 
Exchange Rate (RER), Terms of Trade (TOT), Price of Investment, Reserves/GDP, 
Banking Crisis, Oil Exporters ' Price Shocks, Food Exporters ' Price Shocks, Oil 
Importers ' Price Shocks and Food Importers ' Price Shocks. 
Some of the explanatory variables such as Gross Capital Inflows/GDP, Gross 
Capital Outflows/GDP, Investment share or Gross Capital Formation (percentage of 
GDP), Public Debt/GDP, External Debt/GDP, Inflation, Real Exchange Rate (RER) 
Terms of Trade (TOT), Price of Investment are self-explanatory. 
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Banking Crisis is a dummy variable that has been drawn from the database constructed 
and updated by Laeven and Valencia (2012). It takes the value of one if the country has 
experienced a banking crisis in any of the five years preceding the current year. Trade 
Openness is simply a country's exports plus imports divided by GDP. 
The four variables Oil Exporters ' Price Shock, Food Exporters ' Price Shock, Oil 
Importers ' Price Shock, and Food Importers ' Price Shock are included to check if the 
data reveals anything specific about commodity price shocks in countries that are heavily 
dependent on commodity exports or imports. Including these shocks can capture an effect 
that is above and beyond the effect captured by levels and differences of the country's 
Terms of Trade (TOT). 
Oil Exporter 's Price Shock is defined as the change in the world oil price over the 
current period times the share of oil exports as a percent of GDP. Oil Importer 's Price 
Shock is defined as the change in the world oil price over the current period times the 
share of oil imports as a percent of GDP. The Food Exporters ' and Importers Price 
shock<; are defmed analogously, replacing oil by food. 
Table 6 provides the panel results involving macroeconomic policy variables. The 
initial level of Gross Capital Inflows/GDP is associated with a higher probability of 
growth slowdown episodes . This results are consistent with Aiyer, Duval, et al (2013) 
and indicate either a Dutch Disease-negative impact on an economy due to phenomena 
that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency or Sudden Stops-an abrupt 
reduction in net capital flows into an economy. 
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Table 6. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Macroeconomic Variables 
I. Final Probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Macroeconomic Variables Coef. P> z Coef. P> z 
Gross Capital Inflows/GDP 0.2055 0.004 -0.1 045 0.004 
Gross Capital Formation 0.0653 0.007 
Trade Openness -0.0221 0.005 
Pseudo R2 0.0403 
Obs. 1 062 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
WALS 
Macroeconomic Variables t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
Inflation -0.77 0.1 5 0.95 0.12 
Real Exchange Rate (RER) 0.8 1 0.1 6 0.25 0.02 
Trade Openness 0.16 0.10 -1.13 0.92 
External Debt/GDP -0.76 0.21 -0.04 0.11 
Public Debt/GDP -0.32 0.1 0 0.34 0.14 
Terms of Trade (TOT)* 0.14 0.1 0 -0.33 0.14 
Gross Capital Inflows/GDP 1.91 0.69 -2.05 0.75 
Gross Capital 
Outflows/GDP 0.40 0.1 1 -0.43 0.07 
Gross Capital Formation 0.77 0.1 5 2.15 0.81 
Price of Investment 0.56 0.09 0.1 0  0.03 
Reserves/GDP -0.72 0.1 2 0.08 0.02 
Banking Crisis 0.34 0.09 
Oil Exporters' Price 
Shock* 0.78 0.1 2  
Food Exporters' Price 
Shock* 0.11 0.15 
Oil Importers' Price 
Shock* -0.61 0.08 
Food Importers' Price 
Shock* 0.21 0.1 7  
* Contemporaneous 
Following Aiyer, Duval, et al (2013) , this study has discriminated between the 
Dutch Disease and Sudden Stops by examining the correlation between (a) the initial 
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level of capital inflows and the change in the Real Exchange Rate (RER) and (b) the 
initial level of capital inflows and the change in capital inflows over the current period. 
The correlation coefficient of (b) is strongly negative while the correlation coefficient of 
(a) is close to zero. This result support the Sudden Stops interpretation. Also, a Dutch 
Disease explanation does not fit the situation as the level and change in the RER, both of 
which were included as explanatory variables into the specification, are not found to be 
significant. 
Gross Capital Inflows/GDP in differences is also significantly associated with 
growth slowdowns suggesting that a reduction in Gross Capital Inflows I GDP can cause 
a growth slowdown in the subsequent periods. A rapid increase in an economy's 
Investment Share or Gross Capital Formation is strongly associated with the slowdown 
probability of subsequent periods. 
An increasing Trade Openness result in decreasing slowdown probability for 
subsequent periods. This fmding is consistent with theory as trade openness offers a 
diversification from internal risks to a mix of internal and external risks, thereby acting as 
a buffer against idiosyncratic domestic shocks. 
4.1.6 Economic Structure 
When an economy expands beyond its pre-capitalist stage, it experiences an expansion in 
its formal employment and output in the manufacturing sector. This expansion result in a 
withdrawal of labor from the other parts of the economy, mainly from the initially 
dominant agricultural sector. Harris and Todaro (1970) and Lewis (1979) have viewed 
this migration of labor from agricultural sector to manufacturing sector and the 
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corresponding structural transformation of the economy as the engine of economic 
development and growth. 
The economic structure is an important factor driving growth so this study has 
taken three economic structure variables to study the probability of growth slowdowns. 
The three structural variables-Agricultural Share, Service Share and Manufacturing 
Share. Table 7 presents the results of panel regressions showing that the variables are 
highly significant in both levels and differences. The sign of the coefficients is negative, 
that is, a lower initial share of GDP in agriculture, services and manufacturing and a 
diminishing share of GDP in agriculture, services and manufacturing are associated with 
an increased probability of growth slowdown. BMA and W ALS techniques also confirms 
these findings. These results suggest that economies undergoing rapid structural changes 
are in a concomitant risk of facing slowdowns. During the phases of economic 
development, surplus labor typically moves from the traditional agricultural sector and 
informal services sector to newly expanding industrial sector. As a results, agriculture 
and informal services decline in relative terms, whereas industry and modem 
manufacturing expands. This expansion of industry induces economic growth. But this 
development process involves risks of growth slowdown that would not occur in a low­
income country with no structural transformation and no growth. However, structural 
transformation is needed to ensure growth and the possibility of a slowdown is rather 
preferable to a stagnation. 
It is imperative to study the relationship between growth slowdowns and output 
diversification. Papageorgiou and Spatafora's  (20 1 2) index of Output Diversification, 
covering 12  economy-wide sectors from 2000 onwards, has been used to study the 
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relationship. The Lack of Output Diversification were separately included in the pro bit 
specification due to the unavailability of data relative to the other structural variables 
used. When included separately in the probit specification, the results show that the Lack 
of Output Diversification is associated with higher probability of economic slowdowns. 
Table 7. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Structural Variables 
I. Final Probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Structural 
Variables Coef. P> z Coef. P> z 
Agriculture Share -0.0337 0.000 -0.0653 0.000 
Service Share -0.0 14  0.00 1  -0.0 148 0.005 
Manufacturing 
Share -0.0238 0.004 -0.0357 0.0 1 5  
Pseudo R2 0.0385 
Obs. 1 09 1  
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
Structural 
Variables WALS t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
Agriculture Share -3.20 0.99 -3.01 0.91 
Service Share -2.35 0.77 -3.87 0.54 
Manufacturing 
Share -1.76 0.57 -1.84 0.62 
4.1. 7 Trade Structure 
Facets of Trade Structure of an economy and its relevance to economic growth and 
resilience have long been explored in the growth literature. Regional economic centers 
can expand trade opportunities and facilitate economic growth. Distance can result in 
transportation costs and market segmentation, which may reduce in economies of scale 
for domestic firms. 
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Redding and Venables (2004) showed association between distance metrics and per 
capita income. Boulhol and de Serres (2008) replicated the Redding and Venables (2004) 
study by using a different sample to show that the relationship between distance metrics 
and per capita income is also valid within a panel of advanced countries . Also, regional 
integration can improve growth prospects by allowing economies to take advantage of 
their geographical location. Regional integration can be a strong tool to facilitate growth 
as Ben-David (1 993) pointed out that the trade agreements in Europe have amplified 
convergence among the member nations. 
Export diversification has also been discovered to be favorably related to growth, 
mostly for countries that are at an early stage of development. Koren and Tenreyro 
(2007) pinpointed that economic diversification can increase the resilience of low-income 
countries to external shocks, while Agosin (2003) and Gartner and Papageorgiou (2011)  
gathered evidence that export diversification has a positive impact on growth in case of 
emerging economies too. 
To study the impact of trade structure on slowdown episodes, this study focuses 
on three variables-Distance (GDP weighted), Regional Integration and Lack of Export 
Diversification. The data on Distance (GDP weighted) comes from World Bank. For each 
country i, Distance (GDP weighted) sums the distance to every other country in the world 
j, weighting each distance by the share of country j in world GDP. This suggests that the 
index will be low for countries that are close to large and economically important 
countries but high for countries that are geographically isolated from economic centers. 
Regional Integration is the country's amount of intra-regional trade relative to its total 
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trade. Lack of Export Diversification is a Theil index calculated by Papageorgiou and 
Spatafora (2012) using product data at the four-digit SITC level . 
Table 8. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Trade Variables 
I. Final Probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Trade Variables Coef. P> z Coef. P> z 
Distance 0.0135 0.002 
Refilonal IntefUation -0.0014 0.005 
Pseudo R2 0.0700 
Obs. 699 
II. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
Trade Variables WALS t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
Distance 1.29 0.52 
Regional Integration -1.30 0.53 0.02 0.07 
Lack of Export 
Diversification 0.83 0.11 0.61 0.06 
The results in Table 8 shows that Distance and Regi.onal Integration are both 
important determinants of growth slowdowns. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests also 
confirm the fmdings. The findings suggest that the larger the GDP weighted distance of a 
country from its potential trade partners, the higher the probability of a growth 
slowdown. Also, the greater the share of intra-regional trade undertaken by a country, the 
less likely is the probability of a slowdown. Lack of Export Diversification was not found 
significant because including Export Diversification along with Distance and Regi.onal 
Integration forces to drop a considerable amount of data on Export Diversification 
because of unavailability of data for Distance and Regi.onal Integration. The estimation 
involving only growth slowdowns and Export Diversification suggest that diversified 
export base is indeed result in a lower probability of slowdown. 
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4.1.8 Other Variables 
There are some other important variables associated with growth but these variables do 
not fit under any of the previous categories. The study includes Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization (ELF) Index as this ELF index has often been linked with poor social 
capital and negative economic growth. Tropics-the fraction of a country's  land area that 
lies in the tropical zone, was included to account for the various features of climatic 
conditions on economic growth slowdown episodes. 
Sala-i-Martin, Dopplehofer, and Miller (2004) found that controlled for a being a 
Spanish Colony in the past and having a large Buddhist population are variables that are 
significantly associated with growth, even after controlling for other institutional and 
cultural factors. So, this study has included Spanish Colony and Buddhist population as 
explanatory variables. Finally, Wars and Civil Conflicts, and 
Natural Disasters were included as these incidences can clearly depress economic 
growth. 
Since the explanatory variables are either time-invariant or exogenous in nature, 
only the level values were included in the probit specification. Table 9 presents the 
results and suggests that Wars and Civil Conflicts and Tropics are significantly associated 
with growth slowdown. Increased numbers of Wars and Civil Conflicts increases the 
probability of a growth slowdown. Also the larger the fraction of a country' s area in the 
Tropics, the greater the probability of facing a growth slowdown. 
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Table 9. Probit and Robustness Tests Results for Other Variables 
I. Final Probit Specification; Dependent Variable: Slowdown 
Levels Differences 
Other Variables Coef. P> z Coef. P> z 
Tropics 0.5422 0.021 
Wars and Civil 
Conflicts 0.3851 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0400 
Obs. 825 
Il. Bayesian Averaging Robustness Tests 
Levels Differences 
Other Variables WALS t BMA PIP WALS t BMA PIP 
ELF Index -0.41 0.03 - -
Buddhist 0.12 0.02 - -
Spanish Colony 0.33 0.04 - -
Tropics 1.73 0.58 - -
Natural Disasters -0.19 0.01 - -
Wars and Civil 
Conflicts 2.03 0.69 - -
4.1.9 Summary 
Table 1 0  summarizes the results of the probit analysis by listing all the significant 
explanatory variables. The average marginal effects of each variable have also been 
reported to gain a better understanding of the impact of each variable on economic 
growth slowdown. Also, the last two columns of the table show the effect on the 
probability of a slowdown if the explanatory variables move from the 25th percentile of 
the distribution to the 75th percentile of the distribution. Some of the policy variables 
seem to have a very substantial impact on slowdown probabilities. For instance, the 
results imply that changing trade openness from the 25th percentile level to the median 
lowers the probability of a slowdown by 1 .10 percentage points, while a further move to 
the 75th percentile lowers that probability by a further 1 .30 percentage points. 
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Table 10. Summary of Pro bit Specifications 
Regressors Average Change in Slowdown Probit Coef. Probabilitv from Marginal Effects p(50)-p (25) p(75)-p (50) 
Institutional Variables 
Rule of Law -0. 1 307***  -1 .6 -4.50 -3 .20 
Size of Government -0. 140 1  *** -3 . 1  -2 . 10  -2.00 
Regulation -0.2462*** -1 .2 -1 .40 -1 .50 
D.Size of Government -0. 1 583 ***  -2.9 -2.80 -2.70 
D.Regulation -0. 1 626*** -2.3 -3 .70 -3 .50 
Demo!l"aphic Variables 
Dependency Ratio 0.0 1 72*** 0.3 2.80 2.30 
D.Fertility Rate 0.4436*** 0. 1 0.50 0.50 
D.Dependency Ratio 0.08 1 7*** 0 .2 0.80 0.70 
D.Sex Ratio 0.0790*** 1 .5 0.40 0.30 
Infrastructure Variables 
Electric Power Consumption 0.4286** 1 .6 2.20 2. 10  
Health Variables 
D.Life Expectancy at Birth 0.0292*** 0 .7  1 .40 2.30 
D.Maternal Mortality Ratio 3 .7577** 4.9 2 .30 2.50 
D.Improved Sanitation Facilities -0.9947** -1 .3 -1 .90 -1 .90 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Gross Capital Inflows/GDP 0.2055*** 2 .5  1 .50 2.30 
D.Gross Capital Inflows/GDP -0. 1045*** -1 .5 -3 .50 -4.30 
D.Gross Capital Formation 0.0653*** 1 . 1  1 .90 1 .80 
D.Trade Openness -0.022 1 *** -0.4 -1 . 10 -1 .30 
Structural Variables 
Agriculture Share -0.0337**  -0.4 -2 .80 -3 . 10 
Service Share -0.0 140**  -0.2 -3 .00 -2.80 
Manufacturing Share -0.0238*** -0.3 -1 .40 -1 .30 
D.Agriculture Share -0.0653 ** -0.8 -1 .60 -1 .40 
D.Service Share -0.0 148** -0.2 -2.00 -1 .60 
D.Manufacturing Share -0.0357**  -0.4 -1 .30 -1 . 1 0 
(Lack of Output Diversification) 0.0341  ***  0 .5  2.50 8.30 
Trade Variables 
Distance 0.0 1 35*** 0.2 3 .00 2.90 
Regional Integration -0.0014*** -0. 1 -2 .40 -3 .20 
(Lack of Export Diversification) 0. 1 335***  2 .7  2 .30 2.30 
Other Variables 
Tropics 0.5422*** 3 . 1  4.00 3 .20 
Wars and Civil Conflicts 0.385 1 ** 7. 1 
Notes: 
*p < 0. 1 ,  **  p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0 1 
The Prefix D. refers to differences 
Brackets indicates variables that are sil!'Tlificant onlv when reeressed seoaratelv 
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4.10 Results of Combined Probit Specification 
It is imperative to study the determinants of growth slowdown from a collective 
perspective. This will help resolve the omitted variable bias and provide more meaningful 
results. But due to data unavailability of some variables, the combined regression with all 
the 45 explanatory variables severely restricts the sample size. So, using a forward and 
backward selection procedure, a combined probit specification was estimated using the 
most significant variables from each category. Table 11 reports the results of the 
combined probit specification. 
T bl 11 R ult f C  b "  d Pr b"t S "fi f a e es s o  om me 0 1 )pec1 ca ions 
Ree:ressors Probit Coef. P> z 
Institutional Variables 
Size of Government -0.0846 0. 1 7 1 0  
D.Regulation -0. 1 206** *  0.0000 
Demographic Variables 
Dependency Ratio 0.03 14***  0.0080 
Infrastructure Variables 
Electric Power Consumption 0.25 1 2 * * *  0.0067 
Health Variables 
D.Life Expectancy at Birth 0.045 3 * * *  0.0087 
Macroeconomic Variables 
D.Gross Capital Inflows/GDP -0.0265* 0.0700 
D.Trade Openness -0. 0 1 95 * *  0.0450 
Structural Variables 
Manufacturing Share -0.0520*** 0.0040 
Trade Variables 
Distance 0.0646***  0.000 1 
Regional Integration -0.03 6 1  * * *  0.0005 
Other Variables 
Tropics 0.0008 0.8590 
Notes: 
*p < 0. 1 ,  ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0 1 
The Prefix D. refers to differences 
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By looking at Table 11, the Size of the Government is no longer significant. So, under the 
institutional variables, Regulation is the most significant factor that affects slowdown. 
Dependency Ratio continues to be a significant factor affecting slowdown. For the 
infrastructure, Electric Power Consumption is associated with higher probability of 
slowdowns. Manufacturing Share is important for the sampled countries and help to 
reduce the probability of slowing down. The variables under the Other category is not 
significantly associated with slowdown for the sampled country. 
4.1 1  Full Sample Vs Middle-Income Countries (MICS) 
Since in the sampled countries, the middle-income countries (MICs) differ from the 
others in experiencing a higher frequency of growth slowdowns, it is important to study 
the determinants of growth slowdowns in these middle-income countries and compare the 
results with the results obtained from the probit specifications. To study the Middle­
Income Countries (MICS) better, all the regressions were repeated by restricting the 
sample to Middle-Income Countries (MICS) only. Table 12 shows how the results differ 
across the full sample and restricted sample. 
For the restricted sample, the probit results for the institutional variables suggest 
that the Rule of Law in levels is no longer significant and Size of Government is the only 
significant variable in levels .  The reason could be that, at low levels of income, the 
enforcement of a sound legal system is required, but once a country meets the condition 
of sound legal system, the capacity of the private sector to innovate and grow becomes 
relatively more important. The private sector's capacity to expand can be hampered by 
extensive governmental intervention in the economy, which therefore become significant 
for the Middle-Income Countries (MICs). Also, the coefficient on Regulation in 
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differences is significantly larger for Middle-Income Countries (MICs) than for the full 
sample of countries. This confirms that deregulation is a particularly important channel 
for guarding against growth slowdowns in Middle-Income Countries (MICs). 
For the demographic variables, only the Dependency Ratio in levels and Sex Ratio 
in differences are significant for the restricted sample. That is, the increases in the 
number of dependents on workers and the ratio of men to women both increases the 
probability of slowdown episodes in subsequent periods for the Middle-Income Countries 
(MICs). 
The infrastructure variable-Electric Power Consumption and Rails Lines in 
levels are significant for the restricted sample. The magnitude of the coefficient suggest 
that the infrastructure development matters more once an economy has exceeded the low­
income status. All the health variables in differences are significant for the restricted 
sample but the magnitudes are lower than the full sample coefficients. This suggests that, 
once a country has achieved the middle-income status, the health structure development 
may not be considered as important as in the low-income status. 
The probit specifications using Macroeconomic variables in the restricted sample 
shows almost similar results as found from the full sample. For the structural variables, 
the restricted sample results show that, the Agricultural Share and Service Share in levels 
are no longer significant. As the Middle-Income Countries (MICs) are more focused on 
industry oriented manufacturing, these two variables cease to be significant. 
The trade variables show similar results and it is noted that the magnitude of 
Distance (GDP weighted) has increased for the Middle-Income Countries (MICs). 
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Table 12. Full Sample Vs Middle-Income Countries (MICs) 
Probit Coef. Probit Coef. Regressors 
Full Sample Restricted WALS PIP Samo le 
Institutional Variables 
Rule of Law -0. 1 307••• 
Size of Government -0. 1401 *** -0.3622••• - 1 .99 0.58 
Regulation -0.2462••• -0.7940•••  -3 .24 0.96 
D.Size of Government -0. 1 583 ••• -0.4 1 90••• - 1 .79 0.58 
D.Regulation -0. 1 626•••  -0.9935*** -2.92 0.97 
Demo2ranhic Variables 
Dependency Ratio 0 .0 1 12••• 0 .0534•••  
D.Fertility Rate 0.4436··· 
D.Dependency Ratio 0.08 1 7••• 
D.Sex Ratio 0.0790••• 0 . 1 58 1 ••• 
Infrastructure Variables 
Electric Power Consumption 0.4286** 0.84 1 0•••  1 .70 0.59 
Rail Lines -0 . 1 589** - 1 .99 0.67 
Health Variables 
D.Life Expectancy at Birth 0.0292•••  0.0226••• - 1 .79 0.58 
D.Maternal Mortality Ratio 3 .7577** 2 .9324••• -1 .65 0.52 
D.Improved Sanitation Facilities -0.9947** -0.3580••• -1 .63 0.5 1 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Gross Capital Inflows/GDP 0.2055••• 0. 1 592··· 2.25 0.79 
D.Gross Capital Inflows/GDP -0. 1 045••• -0. 1 695* - 1 .30 0.50 
D.Gross Capital Formation 0.0653 ··· 0.0475•••  2.42 0.84 
D.Trade Openness -0.022 1 ••• -0.03 1 0•••  -2.62 0.72 
Structural Variables 
Agriculture Share -0.0337** 
Service Share -0 .0140**  
Manufacturing Share -0.0238•••  -0.0885** -1 .2 1  0.5 1 
D.Agriculture Share -0.0653 ** -0.0263 •••  - 1 .30 0.52 
D.Service Share -0.0 148** -0 .01 54•••  -1 .73 0.60 
D.Manufacturing Share -0.0357••• -0. 1 60 1 ••• -1 . 84 0.73 
(Lack of Output Diversification) 0.034 1 ••• 
Trade Variables 
Distance 0.0 1 35••• 0.342 1 * 1 .29 0.50 
Regional Integration -0.00 14••• -0.0 1 50••• - 1 .46 0.6 1 
(Lack of Export Diversification) 0. 1 335··· 
Other Variables 
Tropics 0.5422••• 
Wars and Civil Conflicts 0.3851  **  0.6880•••  2.09 0.84 
Notes: 
•p < 0. 1 ,  •• p < 0.05, ••• p < 0.0 1 
The Prefix D. refers to differences 
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From Table 12, it is clear that the findings that both Output Diversification and Trade 
Diversification reduces the probability of a slowdown, when regressed separately, 
disappears when the sample is restricted. This can be explained with the argument that in 
low-income countries, such diversification is particularly necessary for economic growth 
as the low-income countries are transitioning out of a primarily agriculture-based 
economy. 
4.12 Middle Income Trap Vs Regression to the Mean 
This study has already identified the existence of middle income trap and the factors 
associated with the trap. However, one strand of recent growth literature has refuted the 
existence of middle income trap. Bulman, Eden, Nguyen (2014) have argued that there is 
no existence of unusual stagnation at any middle-income levels.  But they agreed that the 
determinants of growth vary at low and high income levels. Pritchett and Summers 
(2014) also argued that the regression to the mean is more robust in the data than the 
middle-income trap. 
To analyze whether the findings of this study is driven by regression to the mean 
instead of a middle-income trap, the sampled countries were divided into three income 
groups following Bulman, Eden and Nguyen (2014). Low-Income countries are those 
countries with a PPP GDP per capita less than or equal to 10% of U.S.  PPP GDP per 
capita (20 11  International $). Middle-Income countries are defmed as the countries with 
PPP GDP per capita between 10% and 50% of U.S .  PPP GDP per capita (20 1 1 
International $). High-Income countries have PPP GDP per capita above 50% of U.S.  
PPP GDP per capita (20 1 1 International $). 
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Figure 2 shows the countries' long run changes in their income relative to the U.S .  The 
log of per capita income relative to the U.S.  in 1 960 is on the X axis and the log of per 
capita income relative to the U.S .  20 1 4  is on the Y axis .  Each axis is divided into three 
areas-- representing the low, middle and high income groups. Countries in the top 
quadrant (in red) are those that have "escaped" from middle income to high income over 
this period. It is clear from the figure that only eleven countries have managed to escape 
the middle-income group over the 55 years. The list of escapees includes Bahrain; Hong 
Kong SAR, China; Israel; Ireland; Japan; Republic of Korea; Portugal; Puerto Rico; 
Saudi Arabia; Spain and Taiwan Province of China. 
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The dominant fact that emerges from the figure confirms the existence of middle-
income trap as only four countries have managed to achieve high-income status over the 
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span on 5 5  years. Table 1 3  provides the income distribution of the sampled countries and 
also shows the income group transitions of the sampled countries. 
Taking 1 960 and 1 970 as the base year to 20 14,  Table 13 shows the income group 
transitions of the sampled countries. It is evident the income levels are highly persistent 
and can be considered sticky. Almost all the high-income countries in 1 960 and 1 970 
remained high income countries in 20 1 4  and few low-income countries joined the 
middle-income status. Most of the middle-income countries remained stuck at the 
middle-income levels except the four countries that graduated to high income status. 
Table 1 3 .  Income Group transitions, Base Years to 20 1 4  
Base Year 
Number of countries in the 1 960 1 970 
sample 
Low Income 5 1  66 
Middle Income 3 8  52 
High Income 1 9  27 
Total 108 145 
Income group transitions (%), base year to 2014 
Low-? Low 44 86.3% 56 84.4% 
Low-7 Middle 7 1 3 .7% 9 1 3 .6% 
Low-? High 0 0.0% 1 1 .5% 
Middle-? Low 2 5 . 8% 1 1 .9% 
Middle-? Middle 25 65 .8% 4 1  78 .8% 
Middle-? High 1 1  28 .9% 1 0  1 9 .2% 
High-? Low 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
High-7 Middle 1 5 .3% 1 3 . 7% 
High-? High 1 8  94.7% 26 96.3% 
Total 108 100.0% 145 100.0% 
There can be the existence of fluid transitions among the sampled countries, that 
is, some countries might have moved to a higher status and then moved back to original 
status over the 55 years' period. However, in most of the cases, once a country moves to 
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a higher income level, the probability of reverting back to a lower income status is 
relatively less. Also, the evaluation the transitions from base year to 20 1 4  only confirms 
the previous findings that most of the middle-income countries are stuck at the middle­
income level. 
To observe the average growth of "escapees", average annual growth rates at 
different per capita income levels relative to the U.S. were plotted. Figure 3 shows the 
growth rates of both escapees and non-escapees. The blue column shows the average 
growth for countries that never escaped the middle-income status, whereas the orange 
column shows the growth rates of those countries that have escaped the middle-income 
status. The escapees have strong growth rates. Also, some of these countries growth rates 
can be close to those of high-income countries and these escapees were able to achieve 
high income status because of their strong growth rates, which in turn were induced by 
country specific policies and conditions. 
In contrast, non-escapees have stable growth rates at all income levels. Non­
Escapees as a whole are not growing towards the high-income status. As a reason, these 
countries can be deemed to be caught at a middle-income trap. The non-escapees as a 
group are facing relative stagnation for the entire period. Figure 3 confirms the existence 
of middle-income trap in the sampled countries as most of the middle-income countries 
are stuck at the middle-income status. 
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Figure 3. Average GDP Growth Rates for Escapees and Non-escapees 
The following graph is drawn by plotting the countries' subsequent 10-year 
average growth against the log of countries ' initial income relative to the U.S .  in 1 960, 
1 970, 1 980, 1 990, 2000 and 20 1 0. Figure 4 also validates the previous findings that 
countries are indeed stuck at middle-income levels. The U-shaped curve implies that the 
countries are systemically slowing down at middle income levels . 
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4.13 Middle-Income Trap and Policy Implications 
This study aims to contribute to the policy formulation by capitalizing on the variables 
identified in the previous sections. Some of the variables identified can be exploited by 
developing effective policies, especially over short time horizons. Prudential regulation 
systems, free trade policies, sound infrastructure, improved health conditions and 
deregulation in required areas are all examples of how growth slowdowns can be avoided 
by an economy in a relatively short period of time. There are indeed some variables that 
can be influenced by policy but only over a medium- to long time horizon, such as 
demographic trends and the rule of law. 
Table B.4.2 (in Appendix B) presents an illustrative "growth slowdown risk" map 
for seven Asian MICs under the seven categories identified in the previous section. Since 
the variables under the "other" category is mostly irrelevant to policy formulations, the 
"other" variables were not included in designing the risk map. The middle-income risk 
map was created following Aiyer, Duval, et al. (201 4). Under each category, a score was 
calculated using the restricted sample coefficients listed in Table 12 to the 20 1 0-20 14 
data for the Asian MICs. This score reflects the probability of an imminent slowdown 
over the next five years. The ranking of one signifies the greatest risk of slowdown in that 
category, whereas seven signifies the least risk. The ranking is not done using levels of 
the underlying variables, but using the weighted mix of levels and differences that came 
out significant in the empirical estimation. The rankings are presented using colors-the 
red color indicates lower rankings while the green color denotes higher ones, relative to 
other countries featured in the table. 
The risk map shows that imply that, compared with other Asian economies, 
so 
Malaysia, the Philippines and China would face a higher risk of growth slowdown 
origination from institutions. The Philippines, Vietnam and India are at risk of slowing 
down due to the demographic factors. The Philippines, India and Indonesia will be facing 
a growth slowdown due to poor infrastructure. On trade, India and China needs to focus 
more on regional integration, while Thailand and the Philippines seem well integrated. 
The rankings in a particular category does not indicate that one country has better 
performance in that category compared to the other country but rather that one country 
has improved more rapidly in that category over the last period of the sample. 
Table B.4.3 expands this methodology to a number of Middle-Income countries 
and try to compare the Asian countries with Latin American and Middle East and North 
African (MENA) countries. It is clearly evident from the Table that, compared with the 
other two regions, Asian countries are facing a high risk of slowdowns due to 
infrastructure. The regional integration in Asian countries compare favorably with Latin 
American and Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Even though India and 
Indonesia were lagging behind the other Asian middle income economies, they are well 
situated in the broader sample. So, the trade is the variable that can strengthen the Asian 
region and work against growth slowdowns. 
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Chapter S 
Conclusion 
This study attempts to uncover two facts-whether the middle-income trap exists and if 
any, then what factors are responsible for the same. The study has identified that some 
Middle-Income Countries (MICs) did get "stuck" at middle-income levels. The fmdings 
suggest that Middle-Income Countries (MICs) that could not "escape" the trap remain 
stagnant and failed to graduate to a high-income status. 
After confirming the existence of "middle-income trap", the study aims to identify 
the determinants of growth slowdowns by using a range of potential explanatory 
variables grouped under eight categories-Institution and Economic Freedom, 
Demography, Infrastructure, Health, Macroeconomic Environment and Policies, 
Economic Structure, Trade Structure and Other. The panel probit estimation techniques 
were employed and the robustness of the results were tested using Bayesian Model 
Averaging Techniques. 
The results showed that the probability of growth slowdowns can be affected due 
to several explanatory variables. Regulation and the Size of Government are important 
institutional variables that can impact growth slowdowns. Several demographic and 
infrastructural issues also influence episodes of slowdowns. Maternal mortality rates, life 
expectancy at birth and improved sanitation facilities also plays role in slowing down a 
country' s growth. 
Macroeconomic policies and environment is the most important factor governing 
growth. The study has controlled for a number of macroeconomic issues to identify the 
macroeconomic variables associated with growth slowdowns. The results show that 
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capital inflows, investment and trade openness are the most crucial factors affecting 
growth slowdowns. Economic share of agriculture, services and manufacturing also 
impacts growth slowdowns. Trade and regional integration are also relevant to growth 
slowdowns as greater share of intra-regional trade results in lower slowdown 
probabilities. The robustness of the results were confirmed using Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA) and Weighted Average Least Square (W ALS) techniques. 
To check whether the causes of slowdown in Middle-Income Countries (MICs) 
are different than the low and high income countries, the study repeats all the regressions 
by restricting the sample to middle-income countries only. The results show that 
government size and regulation are particularly important factors associated with 
slowdowns in Middle-Income Countries (MICs) as limited governmental interventions 
promote private expansion and appropriate deregulation acts as a buffer against economic 
growth slowdowns. Moreover, Infrastructure is significantly associated with slowdowns 
in Middle-Income Countries (MICs). Insufficient infrastructural facilities emerge as a 
potential risk factor for growth. 
Although the study has identified periods of growth slowdowns, it seeks to 
pinpoint that the growth slowdowns were caused due to middle-income trap and not 
merely reflects the regression to the mean phenomenon. To link the growth slowdowns 
with middle-income trap, the study has constructed mobility matrices. The mobility 
matrices reaffirm the existence of middle-income trap in the sampled countries over the 
55-year period horizon. 
The study also offers policy implications for the Middle-Income Countries 
(MICs) by constructing an illustrative slowdown risk map over the next five years and 
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compare the potential risk of slowing down among Asian, Latin American and Middle 
East and North African (MENA) Countries. The slowdown risk map shows that the Asian 
countries are at high risk of slowing down due to poor infrastructure, while Latin 
American and Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are lagging behind in 
trade and regional integration. 
This study is the one of the most comprehensive study on middle-income trap 
involving 145 countries over the period 1 960-2014 .  The methodology of this study is 
more rooted in the growth theory and literature. The study also controls for potential 
endogeneity issues and unavailability of data. The fmdings of this study are fairly 
consistent with theory. With recent anxiety about being stuck at a middle-income, the 
focus on middle-income trap tends to increase. This study is a valuable addition to the 
existing middle-income trap literature. 
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Appendix A 
Tables and Charts 
Table A.3.1.  Growth Slowdowns Episodes 
(By income group) 
2005-2009 Guyana 2005-2009 Peru 
1 980-1 984 Haiti 1 980-1 984 Peru 
1 985-1989 Honduras 1 965-1 969 Philippines 
1 980-1 984 Honduras 1 980-1 984 Poland 
1 995-1 999 Honduras 2005-2009 Portugal 
2005-2009 Indonesia 1 995-1 999 Romania 
2005-2009 Iran 1 970-1 974 Romania 
1 990-1 994 Iran 1 975-1 979 Romania 
2005-2009 Iran 1 995-1 999 South Africa 
1 975-1 979 Iran 2005-2009 South Africa 
2005-2009 Iraq 1 980-1 984 Spain 
1 975-1 979 Jamaica 1 970-1 974 Swaziland 
2000-2004 Jamaica 1 990-1 994 Syria 
1 975-1 979 Jamaica 2005-2009 Syria 
1 980-1 984 Jordan 1 965-1 969 Syria 
2005-2009 Jordan 1 980-1 984 Thailand 
1 980-1 984 Jordan 2005-2009 Thailand 
2005-2009 Kazakhstan 2005-2009 Tonga 
1 970-1 974 Korea, Republic 1 970-1 974 Trinidad of &Tobago 
1 995-1 999 Kyrgyz 1 970-1 974 Trinidad Republic &Tobago 
2005-2009 Lesotho 2005-2009 Tunisia 
2005-2009 Lesotho 2000-2004 Turkmenistan 
1 985-1 989 Malaysia 1 980-1 984 Turkmenistan 
2005-2009 Malaysia 1 995-1999 Uganda 
2005-2009 Maldives 1 985-1 989 Uruguay 
2005-2009 Maldives 2005-2009 Venezuela 
1 980-1 984 Mali 2005-2009 Vietnam 
1 975-1 979 Malta 1 980-1 984 Yemen 
1 975-1 979 Mauritius 1 975-1 979 Yemen 
1 980-1 984 Mexico 1 980-1 984 Zambia 
2005-2009 Namibia 1 970-1 974 
1 995-1 999 Nicaragua 1 965-1 969 
1 975-1 979 Nicaragua 1 985-1 989 
1 995-1 999 Panama 2005-2009 
2005-2009 Panama 1 980-1 984 
2005-2009 Papua New 1 985-1 989 Guinea 
1 975-1 979 Papua New 1 980-1 984 Guinea 
2005-2009 Papua New 1 995-1 999 Guinea 
1 980-1 984 Paraguay 1 980-1 984 
2000-2004 Paraguay 2005-2009 
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1 975-1 979 
1 980-1 984 
2005-2009 
1 980-1 984 
1 970-1 974 
1 975-1 979 
1 980-1 984 
2005-2009 
2005-2009 
1 980-1 984 
1 965-1 969 
1 990-1 994 
1 975-1 979 
1 980-1 984 
1 995-1 999 
1 995-1 999 
2005-2009 
1 985-1 989 
1 965-1 969 
1 980-1 984 
1 975-1 979 
2005-2009 
2005-2009 
2005-2009 
1 995-1 999 
1 975-1 979 
2005-2009 
2000-2004 
2005-2009 
1 970-1 974 
Hieh lncome 
Australia 
Barbados 
Bahrain 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Brunei 
Canada 
Colombia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
Hong Kong SAR 
Hong Kong SAR 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Israel 
Japan 
Japan 
Korea 
Korea 
Korea 
Kuwait 
Malta 
Portugal 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Spain 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Table A.3.1.  Growth Slowdowns Episodes, concluded 
(By income group) 
Low Income 
2005-2009 Afghanistan 1 985-1 989 Pakistan 
1 970-1 974 Bangladesh 2005-2009 Rwanda 
1 980-1 984 Benin 1 970-1 974 Rwanda 
2005-2009 Benin 1 985-1 989 Senegal 
1 980-1 984 Burundi 1 970-1 974 Sierra Leone 
2000-2004 Burundi 2000-2004 Sierra Leone 
2005-2009 Burundi 2005-2009 Sudan 
2005-2009 Cameroon 1 985-1 989 Togo 
1 980-1 984 Congo, Republic of 1 970-1 974 Uganda 
2005-2009 Cote d'Ivoire 1 970-1 974 Zambia 
2005-2009 Denmark 2005-2009 Zambia 
1 990-1 994 Egypt 1 965-1 969 Zimbabwe 
2005-2009 Ghana 1 970-1 974 Zimbabwe 
2000-2004 Indonesia 1 975-1 979 Zimbabwe 
1 980-1 984 Kenya 1 990-1 994 Zimbabwe 
1 990-1 994 Lao P.D.R. 1 985- 1989 
2005-2009 Lao P.D.R. 2005-2009 
2000-2004 Latvia 2005-2009 
2005-2009 Liberia 1 980-1 984 
1 975-1 979 Liberia 1 985-1989 
2005-2009 Liberia 2000-2004 
1 970-1 974 Liechtenstein 2005-2009 
1 990-1 994 Malawi 1 970-1 974 
1 990-1 994 Malawi 1 975-1 979 
1 995- 1 999 Malawi 1 980-1 984 
2005-2009 Malawi 2005-2009 
1 995-1 999 Mauritania 1 975-1 979 
2000-2004 Mongolia 1 990-1 994 
1 990-1 994 Morocco 1 965-1 969 
2000-2004 Mozambique 1 975-1 979 
1 995-1 999 Mozambique 2005-2009 
1 975-1 979 Niger 1 980-1 984 
2000-2004 Nigeria 2005-2009 
2005-2009 Pakistan 1 965-1 969 
2005-2009 Pakistan 2005-2009 
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2005-2009 
1 985-1 989 
2005-2009 
2005-2009 
1 990-1 994 
2005-2009 
2000-2004 
1 980-1 984 
1 970-1 974 
1 975-1 979 
2005-2009 
1 975-1 979 
1 990-1 994 
2000-2004 
2005-2009 
Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Conver2ence1 Conver2ence2 
Egypt 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Honduras 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Jordan 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Morocco 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Nicaragua 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Pakistan 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Spain 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Trinidad&Tobago 1 965-1 969 1 1 
Barbados 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Benin 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Burundi 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Chile 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Cote d' Ivoire 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Ghana 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Iran 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Jamaica 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Japan 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Korea, Republic of 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Malawi 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Namibia 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Portugal 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Congo, Republic of 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Uganda 1 970-1 974 1 1 
Zambia 1 970-1 975 1 1 
Bolivia 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Botswana 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Brazil 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Dominican Republic 1 975-1 979 1 0 
Ecuador 1 975-1 979 1 1 
El Salvador 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Gabon 1 975-1 979 1 1 
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Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes, continued 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Convereence Convereence 
Indonesia 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Iran 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Israel 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Malawi 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Mauritania 1 975-1 979 1 0 
Mauritius 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Mozambique 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Peru 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Romania 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Spain 1 975-1 979 1 0 
Syria 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Tunisia 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Venezuela 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Zambia 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Zimbabwe 1 975-1 979 1 1 
Algeria 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Argentina 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Bahrain 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Barbados 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Brazil 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Brunei 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Cyprus 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Ecuador 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Guatemala 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Haiti 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Honduras 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Hong Kong SAR 1 980-1 984 1 0 
Iraq 1 980-1 984 1 0 
Jordan 1 980-1 984 1 0 
Liberia 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Malawi 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Malaysia 1 980-1 985 1 1 
Malta 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Mexico 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Niger. 1 980-1 984 1 1 
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Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes, continued 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Convergence Convergence 
Panama 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Papua New Guinea 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Paraguay 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Peru 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Poland 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Romania 1 980-1 984 1 1 
South Africa 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Syria 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Togo 1 980-1 984 1 1 
Trinidad&Tobago 1 980- 1 984 1 1 
Argentina 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Algeria 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Benin 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Cameroon 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Congo, Republic of 1 985-1 990 1 1 
Lao P.D.R. 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Liberia 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Maldives 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Nicaragua 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Papua New Guinea 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Rwanda 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Tonga 1 985-1 989 1 1 
Belize 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Cyprus 1 990-1 995 1 1 
Hong Kong SAR 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Jamaica 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Japan 1 990-1 994 1 0 
Kenya 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Korea 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Mongolia 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Portugal 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Sierra Leone 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Swaziland 1 990-1 994 1 1 
Zimbabwe 1 990-1 994 1 0 
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Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes, continued 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Convereence Convereence 
Argentina 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Chile 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Egypt 1 995-1 999 1 1 
El Salvador 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Indonesia 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Iran 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Korea 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Kuwait 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Malaysia 1 995-1 999 1 0 
Papua New Guinea 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Singapore 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Syria 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Thailand 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Uruguay 1 995-1 999 1 1 
Barbados 2000-2004 1 1 
Botswana 2000-2004 1 1 
Burundi 2000-2004 1 1 
Finland 2000-2004 1 1 
Guyana 2000-2004 1 1 
Ireland 2000-2004 1 1 
Lesotho 2000-2004 1 1 
Liberia 2000-2004 1 1 
Malta 2000-2004 1 1 
Portugal 2000-2004 1 1 
Spain 2000-2004 1 0 
Sudan 2000-2004 1 1 
Yemen 2000-2004 1 1 
Zimbabwe 2000-2004 1 1 
Armenia 2005-2009 1 1 
Australia 2005-2009 1 0 
Bahrain 2005-2009 1 1 
Canada 2005-2009 1 1 
Pakistan 2005-2009 1 1 
Philippines 2005-2009 1 1 
Turkmenistan 2005-2009 1 1 
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Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes, continued 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Convere;ence Conver2ence 
Albania 2005-2009 1 1 
Argentina 2005-2009 1 1 
Bangladesh 2005-2009 1 1 
Barbados 2005-2009 1 1 
Belgium 2005-2009 1 1 
Belize 2005-2009 1 1 
Bolivia 2005-2009 1 1 
Brazil 2005-2009 1 1 
Bulgaria 2005-2009 1 1 
Burundi 2005-2009 1 1 
Chile 2005-2009 1 1 
China 2005-2009 1 1 
Colombia 2005-2009 1 1 
Congo, Republic of 2005-2009 1 1 
Cote d' Ivoire 2005-2009 1 1 
Croatia 2005-2009 1 1 
Czech Republic 2005-2009 1 1 
Denmark 2005-2009 1 1 
Ecuador 2005-2009 1 1 
El Salvador 2005-2009 1 1 
Papua New Guinea 2005-2009 1 1 
Gambia 2005-2009 1 1 
Guyana 2005-2009 1 1 
Honduras 2005-2009 1 1 
Iceland 2005-2009 1 1 
Iran 2005-2009 1 0 
Ireland 2005-2009 1 1 
Israel 2005-2009 1 0 
Jamaica 2005-2009 1 1 
Jordan 2005-2009 1 1 
Kazakhstan 2005-2009 1 0 
Korea 2005-2009 1 1 
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Notes: 
Table A.3.2. Growth Slowdowns Episodes, concluded 
(By criteria) 
Country Year Conditional Absolute 
Convereence Convereence 
Lao P.D.R. 2005-2009 1 1 
Latvia 2005-2009 1 1 
Lesotho 2005-2009 1 1 
Liechtenstein 2005-2009 1 1 
Malawi 2005-2009 1 1 
Maldives 2005-2009 1 1 
Mali 2005-2009 1 1 
Mozambique 2005-2009 1 1 
Nigeria 2005-2009 1 1 
Pakistan 2005-2009 1 1 
Panama 2005-2009 1 1 
Paraguay 2005-2009 1 1 
Romania 2005-2009 1 1 
Rwanda 2005-2009 1 1 
Senegal 2005-2009 1 1 
Sierra Leone 2005-2009 1 1 
South Africa 2005-2009 1 1 
Sweden 2005-2009 1 0 
Switzerland 2005-2009 1 0 
Thailand 2005-2009 1 1 
Turkmenistan 2005-2009 1 1 
Vietnam 2005-2009 1 1 
Yemen 2005-2009 1 1 
Zambia 2005-2009 1 1 
Zimbabwe 2005-2009 1 1 
Total 1 95 179 
1. Conditional convergence refers to identifying the growth slowdown episodes using random 
effects panel regressions with physical and human capital as regressors. 
2. Absolute convergence refers to identifying the growth slowdown episodes using random 
effects panel regressions with only initial level of income as regressor. 
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Table A.3.3. Independent Variables: Unit and Sources 
Descriptions Sonrces Category Start End Frequency 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) WDI Demography 1960 2014 Annual 
Dependency ratio United Nations Demography 1960 2014 S-year 
Sex ratio United Nations Demography 1960 2014 S-year 
Population Growth Rate WDI Demography 1960 2014 Annual 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100000 live births) WDI Health 1960 2014 Annual 
Life expectancy at birth WDI Health 1960 2014 Annual 
Improved sanitation facilities WDI Health 1960 2014 Annual 
Agriculture share of value added (percent of GDP) WDI Economic Structure 1960 2014 Annual 
Services share of value added (percent of GDP) WDI Economic Structure 1960 2014 Annual 
Industry share value added (percent of GDP) WDI Economic Structure 1 960 2014 Annual 
Output diversification Papageorgiou and Spatafora (201 2) Economic Structure 2000 2014 Annual 
Rail lines WDI Infrastructure 1960 2014 S-year 
Electric Power Consumption WDI Infrastructure 1 960 2014 S-year 
Internet Access WDI Infrastructure 1960 2014 S-year 
Size of government Economic Freedom dataset Institutions 1960 2014 S-year 
Rule of law Economic Freedom dataset Institutions 1960 2014 S-year 
Freedom to trade internationally Economic Freedom dataset Institutions 1960 2014 S-year 
Regulation Economic Freedom dataset Institutions 1 960 2014 S-year 
Financial openness Chinn and Ito (2006) Institutions 1970 2014 Annual 
Gross capital inflows as percentage of GDP World Economic Outlook; WDI MACRO 1960 ·2014 Annual 
Gross capital outflows as percentage of GDP World Economic Outlook; WDI MACRO 1 960 2014 Annual 
Banking crisis dummy Laeven and Valencia (201 2) MACRO 1970 201 1 Annual 
Real exchange rate WDI MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Inflation WDI MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Trade openness (percent) PWT 8 . l  MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
CPI inflation WDI MACRO 1 960 2014 Annual 
Price level of investment PWT 8 . l  MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
External debt (net) to GDP ratio Lane aod Milesi Ferretti; WDI MACRO 1 960 2014 Annual 
Public debt to GDP ratio WDI MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Terms of trade World Economic Outlook; WDI MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Reserves/GDP ratio World Economic Outlook; WDI MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Investment share of PPP GDP per capita at 2005 constant PWT MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Oil exporters' price shock self �alculated MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Food exporters' price shock self�alculated MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Oil importers' price shock self�lculated MACRO 1960 2014 Annual 
Food importers' price shock self�alculated MACRO 1 960 2014 Annual 
Fraction of country in tropics Saia-i-martin and others (2004) Other 1960 2010 Annual 
Spanish colony Sala-i-martin and others (2004) Other 1 960 2010 Annual 
Fraction Buddhist Sala-i-martin and others (2004) Other 1960 2010 Annual 
Etbno linguistic ftactionali7Ation Saia-i-martin and others (2004) Other 1 960 2010 Annual 
War and civil conflicts Correlates of War Project Other 1 960 2014 Annual 
Natural disaster International Disaster Database Other 1 960 2014 Annual 
Distance (GDP weighted) World Bank TRADE 1 960 2014 Annual 
Regional integration self�lculated TRADE 1 960 2014 Annual 
Trade diversification - Theil Index Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012) TRADE 1 960 2014 Annual 
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Table A.3.4 Summa.rv Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Slowdown (Conditional Convergene) 1305 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Slowdown (Absolute Convergence) 1305 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Maternal Mortality Ratio 1198 222.22 282.66 13 1800 
Improved Saoitation Facilities 1191 69.74 30.07 3.84 100.00 
Life Expectancyat Birth 1305 63.87 11.58 21.38 83.54 
Dependency Ratio 1305 71.54 19.87 18:36 117.55 
Population Growth Rate 1305 1.82 1.42 -3.77 15.53 
Fertility Ratio 1305 3.99 2.06 0.87 8.82 
Sex Ratio 1305 2.06 1.08 1.01 5.57 
Agricultore share of value added (percent of GDP) 1098 18.64 15.95 8.00 92.04 
Services share of value added (percent of GDP) 1076 4.56 4.48 -16.30157 62.99 
Industry share value added (percent of GDP) 1081 15.35 7.38 0.25326 41.30 
Electric Power Consumption 980 3294.04 4600.05 6.668635 52953.95 
Internet Access 986 48.68 29.75 11.69 46.06 
Rail Lines 963 11070.86 26392.99 259.5 256123.20 
Distance (GDP weighted) 1067 61.32 12.93 27.5 91.79 
Tropics as a fraction of a country 911 31.29 22.61 0 98.86 
Regional Integration (in billions) 1098 14700.00 452000.00 7010.00 616000.00 
Gross capital Formation 1048 49.90 22.50 10 39.40 
Inflation 1305 35.34 325.67 -10.7694 10759.60 
Trade Openness 1067 60.00 37.20 -65.50 24.20 
Gross Capital Inflows 1082 3.12 6.00 -17.50768 77.74 
Public Debt/ GDP 1097 54.20 40.20 0.2139 283.75 
Investment 1298 50.40 22.40 0 37.60 
Banking Crisis 1305 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Real Exchange Rate 1305 1 14.80 88.35 33.06342 1768.273 
External debt/GDP 1250 56.21 64.98 0 896.0762 
Terms of Trade 1070 13.50 10.10 55.40 18.60 
Gross Capital Outflows 873 28.90 17.25 1.90 49.35 
Reserve/GDP 920 0.15 4.43 -37.8474 26.78 
Oil exporters' price shock 1305 24.74 79.88 -48.65504 622.2341 
Oil importers' price shock 1305 21.91 42.14 -18.617 250.7623 
Food exporters' price shock 1184 3135.24 3541.08 0.0713963 22627.25 
Food importers' price shock 1181 1729.32 1243.86 108.5638 9214.063 
Rule of law 1012 5.83 1.61 0.6 9.7 
Size of Government 807 5.43 1.83 1 .1  9 .3 
Freedom to Trade internationally 1044 7.00 2.13 0 9.9 
Regulation 1039 6.09 1.34 9.059999 
Chinn-Ito Index 1305 0.03 1.50 -1.863972 2.439009 
Wars and Civil Conflicts 852 26.32 13.25 3.00 53.00 
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Appendh B 
Tables ond Cborts 
Table BA.1 Samnl• Sta1ildcs hv c-..... --. 
Advancod &st Asia and Europe and Latin Middle East South Sub-Sahonm Total Ratio (in 
Pacific Callm! Asia America and and North Asia Africa pmcmt) 
Ille Africa 
n-�•-
Institution and Economic Freedom 
Full Sample 3 3 1  1 3 2  1 88 230 208 7 1  145 1305 24.3% 
Sub Sample 54 57 49 so 21 3 1  55 3 1 7  
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10.1% 14.4% 1 7.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
Sub Sample Regional Coverag e  (%) 17.0% 1 8.0% 1 5.5% 15.S"A. 6.6% 9.8% 17.4% 
Demography 
Full Sample 3 3 1  1 3 2  1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 62.7% 
Sub Sample 1 84 1 1 5  68 109 41 61 240 8 1 8  
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10. 1% 14.4% 17.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Covemge (%) 22.5% 14.1% 8.3% 13.3% 5.0% 7.5% 29.3% 
Inbutructure 
Full Sample 331  132 1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 56.9% 
Sub Sample 178 73 41 1 89 97 59 106 743 
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10.1% 14.4% 1 7.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Covemge (%) 24.0% 9.8% 5.5% 25.4% 13 .1% 7.9% 14.3% 
Health 
Full Sample 331  132 1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 62.4% 
Sub Sample 1 95 85 43 206 1 06 64 1 16 8 1 5  
Full Sample Regional Covemge (%) 25.4% 10. 1 %  14.4% 17.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Coverage (%) 23.9% 10.4% 5.3% 25.3% 1 3.0% 7.9% 14.2% 
Macroeconomic Envlromnent 
Full Sample 3 3 1  1 3 2  1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 57.7% 
Sub Sample 125 107 74 123 176 33 1 15 753 
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10. 1% 14.4% 17.6% 15.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Coverage (%) 1 6.6% 14.2% 9.8% 16.3% 23.4% 4.4% 1 5.3% 
Economic Structure 
Full Sample 331  132 1 88 230 208 71  145 1305 58.2% 
Sub Sample 125 107 74 123 1 76 40 1 15 760 
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10. 1 %  14.4% 1 7.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Covemge (%) 16.4% 14. 1% 9.7% 16.2% 23.2% 5.3% 15.1% 
Trade Structure 
Full Sample 331  132 1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 44.0% 
Sub Sample 138 73 4 1  143 75 35 69 574 
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10. 1 %  14.4% 17.6% 15.9"A. 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
S ub  Sample Regional Coverage (%) 24.0% 12.7% 7.1% 24.9% 13 .1% 6.1% 12.0% 
Other 
Full Sample 3 3 1  1 3 2  1 88 230 208 71 145 1305 73.7% 
Sub Sample 213 95 23 189 1 14 53 275 962 
Full Sample Regional Coverage (%) 25.4% 10. 1 %  14.4% 1 7.6% 1 5.9% 5.4% 1 1 . 1 %  
Sub S•-le Reoional Co�..., 1%) 16.3% 7.3% 1 . 8% 14.5% 8.7% 4.1% 2 1 . 1 %  
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Conn try 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Phillip in 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Table B.4.3 Tra Ma for Asian Middle-Income Countries 
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Country 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Phillipines 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Jordan 
Egypt 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Asia 
Larin America 
MENA 
Table 8.4.3 Tra Ma for Middle-Income Countries Cs 
Institution Demography 
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